The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences (Q690970): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:04, 5 July 2024

scientific article
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English
The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
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    The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences (English)
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    29 November 2012
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    strategy-proofness
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    lexicographically separable preferences
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    generalized random dictatorship
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