Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! (Q1934150): Difference between revisions
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2143114434 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Asymmetric Auctions / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 03:02, 6 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! |
scientific article |
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Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! (English)
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28 January 2013
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auctions
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bankruptcy
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synergies
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procurement
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