Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences (Q1934849): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.010 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W1977695423 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 04:17, 6 July 2024

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Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
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