Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences (Q1934849): Difference between revisions

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+Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
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+Normal rank
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+Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
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+Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Constitutional implementation.
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+The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
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