Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions (Q1936577): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 05:01, 6 July 2024

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Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
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    Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions (English)
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    6 February 2013
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    auctions/bidding
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    budget constraints
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    equilibrium bidding strategy
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    homogenous multiunit
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