Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods (Q1941981): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 07:08, 6 July 2024

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Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
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    Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods (English)
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    25 March 2013
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    allocation mechanisms
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    strategy-proofness
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    dictatorship
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    public goods
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    efficiency
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