An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear (Q1944867): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 07:25, 6 July 2024

scientific article
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English
An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
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    An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear (English)
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    28 March 2013
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    non-quasilinear preference
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    second price auction
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    strategy-proofness
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    equal treatment of equals
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    fair allocation
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