An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830): Difference between revisions

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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6199395
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6199395 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+university admissions
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: university admissions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+matching, stability
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: matching, stability / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+strategyproofness
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: strategyproofness / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+complex constraints
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: complex constraints / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+German admissions system
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: German admissions system / rank @@
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2072823362
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College admissions with affirmative action
@@ Property / cites work: College admissions with affirmative action / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+School choice: an experimental study
@@ Property / cites work: School choice: an experimental study / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient assignment respecting priorities
@@ Property / cites work: Efficient assignment respecting priorities / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Constrained school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Constrained school choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Effective affirmative action in school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Effective affirmative action in school choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Nash implementation of matching rules
@@ Property / cites work: Nash implementation of matching rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation of college admission rules
@@ Property / cites work: Implementation of college admission rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Random matching in the college admissions problem
@@ Property / cites work: Random matching in the college admissions problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An analysis of the German university admissions system
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:361830