How to divide a cake when people have different metabolism? (Q2636922): Difference between revisions

The paper concerns bankruptcy problems in which players have different utility functions defined in terms of the quantity of allocated resources. In Section 2, after introducing a bankruptcy problem and a bankruptcy game without transferable utility, the authors state some properties of the game without transferable utility (Proposition 1) and the relation between the core of the game without transferable utility associated with a bankruptcy problem with utilities and the core of the TU-game associated with the related standard bankruptcy problem (Theorem 1). It is shown that it cannot be guaranteed that the bankruptcy game without transferable utility is cardinally convex (Example 1), but the authors prove that the bankruptcy game without transferable utility is ordinally convex (Theorem 2). Section 3 presents the CEA (constrained equal awards) rule for the bankruptcy problem with utilities. Similarly as the CEA rule applied to a classical bankruptcy problem, the CEA rule in the general setup provides an element of the core of the TU-game associated with the bankruptcy problem (Theorem 3). In Section 4, two axiomatic characterizations of the CEA rule for bankruptcy problems with utilities are provided (Theorems 4 and 5). Section 5 shortly concludes the paper.