A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good (Q2437827): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:53, 7 July 2024

scientific article
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English
A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
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    A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good (English)
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    13 March 2014
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    indivisible private good
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    quasi-linear preferences
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    strategy-proofness
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    Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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