Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848): Difference between revisions

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+Çağatay Kayı
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+W1604893595
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+Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
@@ Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank @@
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
@@ Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank @@
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+Q3995616
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+On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
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+A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
@@ Property / cites work: A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' / rank @@
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+The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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+The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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+Q3999327
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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+A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
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+The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
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+A further note on the college admission game
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