Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities (Q2441227): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.001
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+W2130418032
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
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+Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
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+Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
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+Countervailing incentives in agency problems
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+On countervailing incentives
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