On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints (Q2442845): Difference between revisions

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+Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
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+Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
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+Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
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+Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
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+On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
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+Q5323812
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+On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
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+An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
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+Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
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+Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
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+Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
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+A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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+Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
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+Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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+High bids and broke winners
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