Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis (Q2442854): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Changed an Item
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2163872644 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: School choice: an experimental study / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal truncation in matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM* / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Effective affirmative action in school choice / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments* / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An analysis of the German university admissions system / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 13:38, 7 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
scientific article

    Statements

    Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    1 April 2014
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    college admissions
    0 references
    experiment
    0 references
    quotas
    0 references
    Gale-Shapley mechanism
    0 references
    Boston mechanism
    0 references
    0 references