Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority (Q2442858): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:38, 7 July 2024

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Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
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    Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority (English)
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    1 April 2014
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    delegation
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    real authority
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    strategic ignorance
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