A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions (Q2444685): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.009
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+W2016211995
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+Strategic Information Transmission
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+Strategic argumentation
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+Long persuasion games
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+Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
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+On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
@@ Property / cites work: On Optimal Rules of Persuasion / rank @@
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+Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
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+Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
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+Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
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+Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
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+The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
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+Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
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