On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences (Q2447167): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Murat Ozturk / rank
 
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Property / author: H. J. M. Peters / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:13, 8 July 2024

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On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
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    On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences (English)
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    24 April 2014
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    single-dipped preferences
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    Pareto optimality
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    strategy-proofness
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    committee voting
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