Implementation in an interdependent value framework (Q2452816): Difference between revisions

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+Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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+Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
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+Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
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+Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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+The Limits of ex post Implementation
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+Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
@@ Property / cites work: Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations / rank @@
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+An optimal auction for complements
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+Efficient Auctions
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+Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+An Efficient Auction
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+Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
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