Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol (Q2453420): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:03, 8 July 2024

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Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
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