On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions (Q403716): Difference between revisions

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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6336142 / rank
 
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asymmetric auctions
Property / zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric auctions / rank
 
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request for proposal
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differentiation
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mechanism design
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
first price auctions
Property / zbMATH Keywords: first price auctions / rank
 
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second price auctions
Property / zbMATH Keywords: second price auctions / rank
 
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procurement
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rho-concavity
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Latest revision as of 23:55, 8 July 2024

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On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
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    On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions (English)
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    29 August 2014
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    asymmetric auctions
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    request for proposal
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    differentiation
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    mechanism design
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    first price auctions
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    second price auctions
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    procurement
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    rho-concavity
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