Optimal policy with credibility concerns (Q405540): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.015
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+W1969912956
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+Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
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+Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
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+Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
@@ Property / cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria / rank @@
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+Strategic Information Transmission
@@ Property / cites work: Strategic Information Transmission / rank @@
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+Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
@@ Property / cites work: Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations / rank @@
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+Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
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+Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
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+Perfect sequential equilibrium
@@ Property / cites work: Perfect sequential equilibrium / rank @@
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+Bargaining with imperfect commitment
@@ Property / cites work: Bargaining with imperfect commitment / rank @@
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+Sequential Equilibria
@@ Property / cites work: Sequential Equilibria / rank @@
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+Reputation and imperfect information
@@ Property / cites work: Reputation and imperfect information / rank @@
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+Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
@@ Property / cites work: Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics / rank @@
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+Belief-based refinements in signalling games
@@ Property / cites work: Belief-based refinements in signalling games / rank @@
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+Who Wants a Good Reputation?
@@ Property / cites work: Who Wants a Good Reputation? / rank @@
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+The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
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+Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
@@ Property / cites work: Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence / rank @@
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+Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
@@ Property / cites work: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal / rank @@
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+Public trust and government betrayal
@@ Property / cites work: Public trust and government betrayal / rank @@
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+Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
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+A Theory of Credibility
@@ Property / cites work: A Theory of Credibility / rank @@
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+Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
@@ Property / cites work: Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality / rank @@
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+Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality
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