The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation (Q483904): Difference between revisions

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+.6742
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+Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
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+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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+Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives
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