A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites (Q485804): Difference between revisions

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+Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
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+A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
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+The scholarship assignment problem
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+Virtual implementation in backwards induction
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+Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
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+Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Subgame Perfect Implementation
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+Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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+Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
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