Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank
 
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Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Decentralized job matching / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:59, 9 July 2024

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Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
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