Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820): Difference between revisions

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+W3121615548
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+Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
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+Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Decentralized job matching
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+Q3999327
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+Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
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+Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
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