Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem (Q2341124): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2144068926 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A simple characterization of approval voting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q2783476 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Twitching weak dictators / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Weak independence and veto power. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Collective Choice for Simple Preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Basic Approval Voting Game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Characterizing approval voting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Approval voting on dichotomous preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Axiomatizations of Approval Voting / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 23:35, 9 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers