Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences (Q2341129): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allotment rules / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The division problem with voluntary participation / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A simple characterization of the uniform rule / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q5668220 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q3840272 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Manipulation via Endowments / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Manipulation through bribes / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 23:35, 9 July 2024

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Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
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