Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation (Q2343313): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 01:41, 10 July 2024

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Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
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    Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation (English)
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    5 May 2015
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    Condorcet jury theorem
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    information aggregation
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    large Poisson games
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