Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? (Q2343804): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 01:58, 10 July 2024

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Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
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    Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? (English)
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    6 May 2015
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