Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification (Q2354546): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:19, 10 July 2024

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Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification
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    Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification (English)
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    20 July 2015
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    investor protection
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    risk aversion
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    financial contracts
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    standard debt
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