Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (Q2516229): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W394103507 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / Wikidata QID
 
Property / Wikidata QID: Q42180484 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Good Strategies and Their Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3956774 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4296856 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Evolution of Cooperation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Repeated games with one-memory / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equal Pay for All Prisoners / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4805737 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Unbeatable imitation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3351186 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A commitment folk theorem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3999542 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5491046 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4945845 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3083744 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Calculus of Selfishness / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4885257 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 16:04, 10 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
scientific article

    Statements

    Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    12 August 2015
    0 references
    0 references
    repeated games
    0 references
    zero-determinant strategies
    0 references
    cooperation
    0 references
    reciprocity
    0 references
    extortion
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references