Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency (Q497946): Difference between revisions

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+MaRDI publication profile
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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0173-x
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+W2013998334
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
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+The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
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+The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
@@ Property / cites work: The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules / rank @@
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+Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
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+Q4942667
@@ Property / cites work: Q4942667 / rank @@
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+Geometry of voting
@@ Property / cites work: Geometry of voting / rank @@
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+Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+Social Choice Scoring Functions
@@ Property / cites work: Social Choice Scoring Functions / rank @@
+Normal rank