Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes (Q898672): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Vincent R. Merlin / rank
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Latest revision as of 05:00, 11 July 2024

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Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
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    Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes (English)
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    18 December 2015
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    scoring rule
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    consistency
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    collective ranking
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    committee
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    paradox
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    impartial culture
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