Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result (Q900445): Difference between revisions

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+On a characterization of stable matchings
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+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
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+A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Cumulative offer process is order-independent
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+Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
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+On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
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+Q4902563
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
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