Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0909-0
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+W1130985054
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+Q4495209
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+On the Justice of Decision Rules
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+Q3266133
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+Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
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+Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Strategic voting and nomination
@@ Property / cites work: Strategic voting and nomination / rank @@
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+The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
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+Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
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+Geometry of voting
@@ Property / cites work: Geometry of voting / rank @@
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
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+The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
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