Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining (Q5963300): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:02, 11 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6550685
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Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6550685

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