The justification of the basic laws of logic (Q266663): Difference between revisions

Attributing the properties of logical truth or logical consequence to a schematic sentence or argument is an activity, the belief to which should be justified. The author first analyses the claim that this belief is justified by the fact that logic is analytic. This possibility is however connected with some problems: the attributed properties are apparently given by an implicit definition but any attempt of justifying particular instances of a logical law leads to circularity. Further, we do not know when the implicit definition took place. Also, we are not able to explain why there are so many disagreements about logical laws. The second possibility: we can advert on the fact that logical laws are central in the web of belief. Here, they just appear to be necessary or a priori but we are not ready to change them. There are some problems with this possibility as well. Quine's attempt at a solution of some such problems is shown to be untenable for modal logic (its refusal) as well as for accepting some more general principles (conservativeness, simplicity etc.) and as for the relation of logic to scientific disciplines. The final solution is contained in the third chapter (``Logic isn't basic, reasoning is''). Here, the author explains his solution by narrating a story about a fictive student who accepts classic logic in the first class, but having some further information in the next semester begins to prefer a three-valued logic instead. The next phase comes when even this standpoint is revised, and having been taught that sentences can have one of the four classes (True, False, Both, Neither) the student goes back to classical logic and accepts again that the law of excluded middle is a logical truth. Briefly: One can accept a logical law given a certain theory. This solution differs from Quine's standpoint: ``\dots it is one thing to say that one might have justification to reject a law of logic, and simply a different thing to say that the laws of logic are contingent''. This weighing of different theories and having sometimes a good reason to give up belief in them ``is consistent with their being analytic''.