Matching with aggregate externalities (Q277295): Difference between revisions

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+On a characterization of stable matchings
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+Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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+A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Stability of marriage with externalities
@@ Property / cites work: Stability of marriage with externalities / rank @@
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
@@ Property / cites work: Stable matchings and preferences of couples / rank @@
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+Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
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+Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
@@ Property / cites work: Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities / rank @@
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+Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
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+Q3999327
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+Two-sided matching problems with externalities
@@ Property / cites work: Two-sided matching problems with externalities / rank @@
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