Median stable matchings in two-sided markets (Q290162): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 01:56, 12 July 2024

scientific article
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Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
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    Median stable matchings in two-sided markets (English)
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    1 June 2016
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    median stable matchings
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    many-to-one matching with wages
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    many-to-many matching
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    matching with contracts
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    strong substitutability
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    law of aggregate demand
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