Median stable matchings in two-sided markets (Q290162): Difference between revisions

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Property / author
 
Property / author: M. Dambrine / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C27 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6588257 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
median stable matchings
Property / zbMATH Keywords: median stable matchings / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
many-to-one matching with wages
Property / zbMATH Keywords: many-to-one matching with wages / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
many-to-many matching
Property / zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many matching / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
matching with contracts
Property / zbMATH Keywords: matching with contracts / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
strong substitutability
Property / zbMATH Keywords: strong substitutability / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
law of aggregate demand
Property / zbMATH Keywords: law of aggregate demand / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2306544911 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
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Revision as of 01:56, 12 July 2024

scientific article
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Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
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    Median stable matchings in two-sided markets (English)
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    1 June 2016
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    median stable matchings
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    many-to-one matching with wages
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    many-to-many matching
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    matching with contracts
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    strong substitutability
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    law of aggregate demand
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