Median stable matchings in two-sided markets (Q290162): Difference between revisions
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Property / author | |||
Property / author: M. Dambrine / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C27 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH DE Number | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6588257 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
median stable matchings | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: median stable matchings / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
many-to-one matching with wages | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: many-to-one matching with wages / rank | |||
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many-to-many matching | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many matching / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
matching with contracts | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: matching with contracts / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
strong substitutability | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: strong substitutability / rank | |||
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law of aggregate demand | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: law of aggregate demand / rank | |||
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Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
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Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004 / rank | |||
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Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2306544911 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Stable schedule matching under revealed preference. / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Quantile stable mechanisms / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Median stable matchings in two-sided markets / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Median stable matching for college admissions / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Median stable matching for markets with wages / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications / rank | |||
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links / mardi / name | links / mardi / name | ||
Revision as of 01:56, 12 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Median stable matchings in two-sided markets |
scientific article |
Statements
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets (English)
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1 June 2016
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median stable matchings
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many-to-one matching with wages
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many-to-many matching
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matching with contracts
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strong substitutability
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law of aggregate demand
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