Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains (Q2819466): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:51, 12 July 2024

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Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
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    Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains (English)
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    29 September 2016
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    bribeproof mechanism
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    monetary transfer
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    two-values domains
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    path auction
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    binary allocation
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