Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801): Difference between revisions

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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6647332 / rank
 
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school choice
Property / zbMATH Keywords: school choice / rank
 
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school quality
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matching
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stability
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efficiency
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.001 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:35, 12 July 2024

scientific article
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Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
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    Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (English)
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    3 November 2016
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    school choice
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    school quality
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    matching
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    stability
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    efficiency
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