Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.001
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W3126143601
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W3126143601 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Constrained school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Constrained school choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
@@ Property / cites work: Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q2921653
@@ Property / cites work: Q2921653 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
@@ Property / cites work: Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Pricing and investments in matching markets
@@ Property / cites work: Pricing and investments in matching markets / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:337801