Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? (Q2829680): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Gilbert Laffond / rank
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Property / author: Gilbert Laffond / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_7 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W120949863 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 21:18, 12 July 2024

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Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?
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    Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? (English)
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    8 November 2016
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