Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender (Q503060): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:26, 13 July 2024

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Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
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    Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender (English)
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    11 January 2017
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    Bayesian persuasion
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    signaling
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    information transmission
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