Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409): Difference between revisions

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+W2572854778
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+Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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+Two-sided matching with interdependent values
@@ Property / cites work: Two-sided matching with interdependent values / rank @@
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+On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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+Incomplete information, credibility and the core
@@ Property / cites work: Incomplete information, credibility and the core / rank @@
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+Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
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+The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
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+Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
@@ Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank @@
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+Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
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+Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
@@ Property / cites work: Stable Matching With Incomplete Information / rank @@
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+Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
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+Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
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