The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas (Q2962147): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / author @@
-Åke Brännström
@@ Property / author: Åke Brännström / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / author @@
+Åke Brännström
@@ Property / author: Åke Brännström / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115219109
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2071212584
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2071212584 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Wikidata QID @@
+Q35709162
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q35709162 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The carrot vs. the stick in work team motivation
@@ Property / cites work: The carrot vs. the stick in work team motivation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+EFFECTS OF SPACE IN 2 × 2 GAMES
@@ Property / cites work: EFFECTS OF SPACE IN 2 × 2 GAMES / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the design of peer punishment experiments
@@ Property / cites work: On the design of peer punishment experiments / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
+Normal rank