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Latest revision as of 12:59, 13 July 2024

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On the operation of multiple matching markets
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    On the operation of multiple matching markets (English)
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    16 March 2017
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    market design
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    strategy-proofness
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    second-best incentive compatibility
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    top trading cycles rules
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    deferred acceptance rules
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