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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2017.02.006 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 15:03, 13 July 2024

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Persistence extends reciprocity
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    Persistence extends reciprocity (English)
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    29 March 2017
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    evolutionary game theory
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    iterated prisoner's dilemma
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    imperfect information
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    persistence
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    invariant of motion
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    trade-off
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