Combinatorial auctions without money (Q521808): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:56, 13 July 2024

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Combinatorial auctions without money
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    Combinatorial auctions without money (English)
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    12 April 2017
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    combinatorial auctions
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    algorithmic mechanism design
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    approximate mechanism design without money
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    mechanisms with verification
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